Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson (1997) Remarks on relevance theory and the social sciences. Multilingua 16, 145-51.

“Some commentators have described the relevance-theoretic approach to communication as psychological rather than sociological. Often, this is intended as a criticism. We would like to respond by reflecting in very general terms about possible interactions between relevance theory and research programmes in the social sciences…” [PDF version]

Dan Sperber (1997) Intuitive and reflective beliefs. Mind and Language 12(1), 67-83.

Abstract: Humans have two kinds of beliefs, intuitive beliefs and reflective beliefs. Intuitive beliefs are a most fundamental category of cognition, defined in the architecture of the mind. They are formulated in an intuitive mental lexicon. Humans are also capable of entertaining an indefinite variety of higher-order or “reflective” propositional attitudes, many of which are of a credal sort. Reasons to hold “reflective beliefs” are provided by other beliefs that describe the source of the reflective belief as reliable, or that provide explicit arguments in favour of the reflective belief. The mental lexicon of reflective beliefs includes not only intuitive, but also reflective concepts. [PDF version]

Dan Sperber (1997) Methodological individualism and cognitivism in the social sciences. Unpublished English version of “Individualisme méthodologique et cognitivisme.” In R. Boudon, F. Chazel & A. Bouvier (eds.), Cognition et sciences sociales (Presse Universitaires de France), 123-136.

“I would like to contrast two interpretations, a weak one and a strong one, of the notion of methodological individualism, and two interpretations, a weak one and a strong one, of the notion of cognitivism. This double contrast determines four ways in which one might choose to be at the same time a methodological individualist and a cognitivist in the social sciences. One way, where both positions are adopted with a weak interpretation, is of little interest. I will argue that another way, where both positions are adopted with a strong interpretation, is incoherent. I will compare the two other possibilities…”

Dan Sperber (1997) Individualisme méthodologique et cognitivisme. In R. Boudon, F. Chazel & A. Bouvier (eds.), Cognition et sciences sociales (Presse Universitaires de France), 123-136.

“Je voudrai ici contraster deux interprétations, l’une faible, l’autre forte, de la notion d’individualisme méthodologique, et deux interprétations, l’une faible, l’autre forte, de la notion de cognitivisme. Des quatres façons dont il serait concevable de se vouloir individualiste et cognitiviste à la fois, l’une (où l’on adopte les deux positions dans leur interpétation faible) est de peu d’intérêt. Je soutiendrai qu’une autre façon (où l’on adopte les deux positions dans leur interprétation forte) est incohérente. Je comparerai les deux autres possibilités…” [PDF version]